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a new subsection (d) to section 55-142 (foreign corporations) per-
mits the agent to handle this matter. It is of limited interest, but
of considerable utility to agents serving corporations by furnishing
a registered office and agency.
A 1965 amendment20 added, to the tail-end of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, a new section 55-97.1 authorizing stock trans-
fer through transfers and pledges of shares within a central deposi-
tory system, such as the New York Stock Exchange has available
through its Clearing Corporation. The provision is identical with
section 8-320 of the Uniform Commercial Code which was adopted
when the Code was enacted in North Carolina.21 Since the Code
will be effective July 1, 1967, it is difficult to see why the same
language was added to the corporation law, especially as a dangling
appendix to the soon-to-be-repealed Stock Transfer Act, unless pos-
sibly it was intended to make immediately effective this new and
sophisticated mode of transfer.
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
Corporations-Stock Options-Validity and Federal Tax
Requirements
The stock option plan as an incentive device for key corporate
personnel has come into widespread use. Although the prime factor
for the growth of such plans in the corporate community has been
the favorable tax treatment of the proceeds, compliance with the
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code provisions,' necessary
to obtain capital gains rates, is not per se sufficient to insure the
validity under state law of a plan challenged by a minority stock-
holder.2 Thu.s, a corporation seeking to adopt an option plan must
20 N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 843..
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-320 (1965).
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-425.
".[S]ince, under the Internal Revenue Code, the favored position with
respect to options granted as part of compensation to corporate offi-
cials can be obtained only if the options are exercised while in the
corporation's employ, the result will be to persuade the optionees to
remain in the corporation's employ. Even if the inferences . . . are
justified, they are dependent entirely upon the present state of the
federal taxing policy and, as such, too insecure in nature to be re-
garded as a condition of the stock option plan designed to insure
that the corporation will receive the contemplated benefit.
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 77, 90 A.2d 652, 657(Sup. Ct. 1952).
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recognize the requirements of local corporation statutes' as well as
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code if the plan is to achieve
its desired effect.
4
The courts have been reluctant to prescribe a set of minimum
requirements' by which a corporation can insure the plan will not
be invalidated if attacked as a waste of corporate assets6 or as un-
reasonable compensation. It is clear that there must be at least legal
consideration to the corporation for the grant of the options." Ac-
quiring and retaining key personnel' and securing contracts of em-
ployment' are the two most common benefits received by the corpo-
ration, and the presence of either is usually deemed sufficient
consideration to support the grant of the options.
The Delaware courts have abandoned testing the validity of
stock options solely on the basis of legal consideration in the con-
' Controversy resulting from the issuance of stock option plans by cor-
porations upon the approval of the board of directors and stockholders in-
volves the internal affairs of the corporation and is therefore governed by
the laws of the state of the corporation's origin. E.g., Gaynor v. Buckley,
318 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1963); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d
731 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
' Stock options may be granted for reasons other than the receipt of
capital gains rates. For a discussion of the tax treatment of "non-statutory"
stock options, those not specifically sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code,
see generally Edwards, Executive Compensation: The Taxation of Stock
Options, 13 VAND. L. REv. 475 (1960). See also 44 GEO. L.J. 426 (1956);
35 N.C.L. Rav. 160 (1956).
'No rule of thumb can be devised to test the sufficiency of the condi-
tions which are urged as insurance that the corporation will receive
the contemplated benefit. The most that can be said is that in each
case there must be some element which, within reason, can be ex-
pected to lead to the desired end. What that element may be can well
differ in each case.
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 76, 90 A.2d 652, 657
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
Where a gift or waste of corporate assets is concerned, shareholder
ratification is not effective against the protest of a minority stockholder.
Shareholder ratification to be effective in these circumstances must be
unanimous. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933). Accord, Kaufman v.
Shoenburg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952); Rosenthal v. Burry
Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948).
'5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRPoRATIoNs § 2143 (Rev. ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch.
1948); 5 FLETCHER § 2142.
'See Wise v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950); Olson
Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1965); Sandier v. Schenley
Indus., Inc., 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606 (Ch. 1951); Eliasburg v. Standard
Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952).
10 See Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del. 1948); Forman v.
Chesler, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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tract sense, adopting instead a rule based on benefit to the corpora-
tion. The rule, first announced in the leading case of Kerbs v. Cali-
fornia Eastern Airways,:" has been stated as follows:
Each stock option must be tested against the requirements that it
contains conditions, or that surrounding circumsances are such,
that the corporation may reasonably expect to receive the con-
templated benefit from the grant of the options, and there must be
a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefits pass-
ing to the corporation and the value of the options granted.12
The presence of the legal consideration is partial but not conclusive
assurance that the corporation will receive the benefit it expects to
gain from the issuance of the options.
In the Kerbs case a stock option plan was adopted by an inter-
ested board, five of the eight directors ultimately benefiting under
the plan. The proposal, approved by a majority of the stockholders,' 3
provided that the options were to be exercisable at any time within
a five-year period and, in addition, could be exercised for a period
of six months after the termination of the optionee's employment.
In invalidating the plan, challenged by a minority shareholder as
being without consideration to the corporation, the court found the
fact that the optionee could have resigned and still exercised his
option rights in toto did not reasonably insure that the corporation
would receive the contemplated benefit-the retention of the services
of the employee.
Although Kerbs stood on a lack of consideration to the corpora-
tion, the Delaware court indicated that, had consideration been
present, it would investigate the reasonable relationship between the
value of the options granted and the value of the services rendered
even where the plan had been ratified by a majority of the stock-
holders. 4 This approach, which amounts to judicial review of the
1133 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d
839 (1954). See generally Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HAR. L. REV.
1403 (1952). See also Dwight, Employee Stock Options: The Clydesdale
Rule, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 1003 (1952); 62 YALE L.J. 84 (1952).1 Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610, 612 (Del. Ch. 1965).
1" Ratification by a majority of the stockholders cures any voidable defect
in the action of the board of directors and is effective for all purposes
unless the action of the directors constitutes a gift of corporate assets or
is ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch.
234, 2 A.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1938); 5 FLETCHER § 2139.
"" Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 75, 90 A.2d 652,
656 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See note 13 supra.
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business judgment of the directors, was even more evident in
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp.,'5 decided simultaneously with
Kerbs. In reversing summary judgment for the defendant corpora-
tion, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the interested board
must satisfy the court that the option was as favorable a bargain
to the corporation as if the directors had been dealing with outsiders.
On rehearing, however, the court rested the burden of proof as to
the reasonable relation between the values of the options granted
and benefits received on the directors only absent shareholder ratifi-
cation, noting that such approval would not preclude a judicial in-
quiry into the adequacy of consideration to the corporation where
the board of directors was interested.16
The term "consideration" as used in the Kerbs and Gottlieb
decisions is somewhat misleading, since it is apparent that there
must be something more than the proverbial "peppercorn." In Beard
v. Elster,17 the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
consideration as applied to stock options, noting that the use of this
term in Kerbs
was possibly ill-advised since it is regarded, apparently, by some
as a measurable quid pro quo .... It, of course, by the very
nature of things cannot be that. It is incapable of measurement
except in terms of business judgment that the plan will spur em-
ployees on to greater efforts which in the long run will benefit
the corporation.' 8
The Beard case, a pivitol decision in this area, applied to stock
options the traditional Delaware policy of generously recognizing
1 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1952), on reargument, 33 Del.
Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952); 101 U. PA. L. REv. 407.
" On a motion for summary judgment by the defendants in a stockhold-
er's action, the burden of proof, absent shareholder ratification, is on the
interested directors to show to the court's satisfaction that the directors
did, in fact, act in utmost good faith and exercised scrupulous fairness. The
plaintiff does not have the burden of coming forward with further evidence
to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact relating to
the question of fairness until the moving defendant has discharged his
burden of negating the plaintiff's claim of unfairness. If the stockholders
ratified the plan,- the burden of proof on the directors is reduced to showing
that the terms of the plan were not so unbalanced as to amount to waste
or that the question is such a close one factually as to fall within the realm
of sound business judgment. Alcott v. Hymen, 40 Del. Ch. 449, 208 A.2d
501 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
1739 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1960); 2 BosToN COLLEGE
INDUSTRIAL & COmmERCIAL L. REv. 405 (1961); 6 How. L.. 213 (1960).
'a1d. at 160, 160 A.2d at 736.
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the business judgment of the directors. Prior to Beard the Delaware
courts had not clearly recognized incentive as sufficient benefit to
the corporation to support an option.19 However, the courts had
viewed incentive as the motivation for granting options but had
required a showing that existing conditions or circumstances rea-
sonably insured that the corporation would, in fact, receive the con-
templated benefit.2" Rather than conclude that incentive was not
sufficient benefit to the corporation, the court placed the burden of
proof on the objector to show that there was no reasonable relation
between the values of the options granted and the services ren-
dered.2' Absent such a showing, the proper solution was to accept
the bona fide business judgment of the directors.22
This view was carried to its logical conclusion in Olson Bros., v.
Englehart.23 The interested board of a derelict corporation, termed
an "empty shell' 2 by the court, adopted an option plan later ratified
by a majority of the stockholders. The court upheld the validity of
the options even though several directors seeking to exercise them
were no longer employed by the corporation. The fact that the
directors had remained with the corporation until their services were
no longer required vindicated the sound business judgment of the
board.25 As the objector had failed to demonstrate conclusively that
the value of the options had no reasonable relation to the value of
the services rendered,28 the court accepted the directors' decision.
1 See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 '(Sup.
Ct. 1952); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d
652 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299,
60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948).
:0 See Kaufman v. Shoenburg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952).
91 See note 16 supra.
"After the Kerbs and Gottlieb decisions, Delaware amended its statute
making directors' decisions as to consideration for the issuance of options
conclusive absent actual fraud. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (Supp. 1964).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-46(f) (1965). But see Frankel v. Donovan,
35 Del. Ch. 443, 120 A.2d 311 (Ch. 1956).
"-211 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1965).
'Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 223, 195 A.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2 It appears that if the optionee remains in the corporation's employ
until the contemplated benefit has passed to the firm, the court will uphold
the option by the application of a test of "hindsight," despite an absence of
conditions insuring its receipt. See Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610,
615 (Del. Ch. 1965); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731,
738 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
26 The issue was "in the twilight zone where reasonable businessmen,
fully informed, might differ." Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160
A.2d 731, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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While state law controls the validity of stock options challenged
by minority stockholders, it has been noted that the tax benefits
gained by compliance with the Internal Revenue Code provisions
often motivate the adoption of a plan. In 1964, Congress, recogniz-
ing the abuses inherent under the old restrictive stock option provi-
sions but convinced that stock options could provide incentive to key
personnel, made radical amendments now appearing as sections 421
through 425 of the Code.2" The former restrictive stock option pro-
visions are now found in section 424 and, with certain exceptions,
relate only to options granted prior to January 1, 1964.29 The quali-
fied stock option3" is intended by Congress to replace the former re-
stricted stock option as an incentive to personnel whose individual
efforts influence the fortunes of their firm.3 ' This plan is to be
distinguished from the employee stock purchase plan,3 2 required to
be made available to all employees on a basis that does not discrimi-
nate in favor of supervisory or highly compensated personnel, 3
although both plans receive the favorable tax rates previously ac-
corded the restricted stock option.
Although the new rules of the 1964 Revenue Act have sub-
stantially increased the technical difficulties of devising and exercis-
ing options,34 the amended provisions have eased the burden of
drafting a plan that complies with both state law and the Code
requirements. The statute requires the existence of a written plan
ratified by the stockholders, 5 which insures that they are apprised
of and approve the plan.38 This ratification would then seem to be
sufficient in questions concerning the burden of proof as to the
= INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-425.
28 See generally Baker, Employee Stock Option Plans Under the Revenue
Act of 1964, 20 TAx L. REv. 77 (1964).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 424(c) (3).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422.31H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1963); S. REP. No. 830,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1964).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 423.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 423(b) (4) (D).
" See Rubenfeld, Qualified Stock Options: Some Developing Problems
Under the 1964 Revenue Act, 21 J. TAXATION 140 (1964). See also Baker
supra note 28.
88 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (1).
In order to ratify effectively an option plan adopted by an interested
board, shareholders must be given reasonably full information as to its ad-
vantages and disadvantages and ratification extends only to things about
which the shareholders are informed. See Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d 432
(9th Cir. 1963); Kaufman v. Shoenburg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786
(Ch. 1952).
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reasonable relation between the options granted and the benefits
received under state law.37 Too, the requirement that the option
price be the fair market value of the stock at the time the option
is granted38 reduces the compensatory nature of the option and is
additional evidence of reasonableness.
Under the new tax provisions, the employee must remain in the
corporation's employ at all times from the date of the granting of the
option until a date three months before its exercise.3' If the option
complies with the statute in this respect, it would seem by implication
to meet the requirements of state law that there be a valid contract of
employment or other device to retain the continued services of the
optionee as long as this is sufficient benefit to the corporation under
the Kerbs test.4 It would also seem to negate the court's argument
in Kerbs that compliance with the Code provisions does not reason-
ably insure the corporation will receive the contemplated benefit."
However, if the corporation is best to insure the continued services
of the optionee, the plan should provide that the options granted may
be exercised in installments spaced over the entire period of the op-
tion, in no event more than five years from the date of the grant of
the option.'
The new Internal Revenue Code provisions have forced firms
to decide whether favorable tax rates are the primary reason for
granting options. If so, the plan must recognize and comply with
the Code requirements. Having complied with the tax statute the
corporation still may exercise broad discretion as to the conditions
that it may impose on the enjoyment of options by executives, but
that must be included to insure benefit to the corporation as re-
quired by state law. A balancing of interests must be considered;
for if too many restrictions are imposed on the employee's enjoy-
ment of that right, the purpose of the plan, employee incentive, may
well be defeated.
JOHN VAN LINDLEY
See note 16 supra, as to the burden of proof.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (4).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(a) (2).
40 See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
"See note 2 supra.
'2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (3). See, e.g., Gruber v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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